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Abstract—The EPCglobal network is designed to function
as a global information retrieval network for objects carrying
RFID tags with an Electronic Product Code (EPC). To locate
corresponding information sources a so-called Object Name
Service (ONS) is used. We take a look at privacy and security
implications of ONS deployment and evaluate possible mitigation
strategies.
I. THE EPC NETWORK
The idea of the ”Electronic Product Code” (EPC) standard
is to assign a globally unique number to every RFID tag. This
EPC is serving as an identifier for the physical object carrying
the tag, which can now be recognized, identified and tracked
by an IT infrastructure [1].
Though the EPC standard is actually a meta framework for
different encoding schemes and name spaces, most EPCs have
a structure similar to the one shown in Fig. 1 [2] that depicts
an example EPC for one of the most popular standards, the
Serialized Global Trade Identification Number (SGTIN) [1,
p.12].
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Fig. 1. Example Electronic Product Code (EPC)
EPCglobal, having its origins in the Auto-ID labs of MIT, is
a joint venture between EAN International (now GS1) and the
Uniform Code Council (UCC) with the focus on developing
and establishing global standards for RFID, EPC and the EPC
network.
According to their intention, information about an object
should in general not be stored on its RFID tag itself, but
instead be supplied by distributed servers on the Internet
[3]. By using the EPC and the help of an Object Name
Service (ONS) it will be possible to locate EPC Discovery and
EPC Information Services (EPC-IS), which are collections of
available data about the particular object [4].
One of the advantages the EPC Network offers is to let
many parties (e.g. manufacturers, suppliers, shops or after-
sale service providers) dynamically register any kind of EPC
Information Service for the objects they are concerned with,
thereby creating an open way to exchange product related
information.
It can be easily anticipated that in general a static list of
available services might be outdated soon. A solution would
be to first ask the ONS for a recent list of sources each time
you like to access information about a particular object. After
retrieving this list you could directly contact all or some of
the EPC Information Services you are interested in (Fig. 2)
[5]. All these procedures will in most cases not be conducted
manually, but in an automated fashion, e.g. by the use of web
services [6, p.4].
Example application scenarios are supply chain management
[6] – increasing efficiency, flexibility and co-operation – or
smart homes [7], where a home IT infrastructure needs to
identify objects of the real world to provide services.
Since ONS is one of the major building blocks of the global
network infrastructure as foreseen by EPCglobal, we investi-
gate it with a view to security issues.
II. ONS TECHNICAL DETAILS
Technically spoken the ONS is a subset of the Domain
Name System (DNS) [8][9]. The main design idea is to first
encode the EPC into a syntactically correct domain name, then
to use the existing DNS infrastructure to query for additional
information. This procedure makes use of the NAPTR (Name
Authority Pointer) DNS record, which is also used with the
SIP protocol for VoIP to map an E.164 telephone number into
a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) [10].
The ONS resolution process is described in [11] and [5]. After
a RFID reader has received an EPC in binary form, it forwards
it to some local middleware system (Fig. 3). To retrieve the
list of relevant EPC-IS servers for this particular object, the
middleware system converts the EPC to its URI form [1, p.53]
(e.g. urn:epc:id:sgtin:47400.11015.473201).
Then it is handed over to the local ONS resolver, which
in turn translates the URI form into a domain name (e.g.
11015.47400.sgtin.id.onsepc.com) by following a
well-defined procedure [11, Section 5]. This name is part of
a sub domain of onsepc.com, which is reserved for ONS
use.
The current ONS specification states that the serial part (item
level, in our example: 473201) of the EPC should not be
encoded for now, but leaves room for such a possibility [11,
Section 3.2.1]:
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Fig. 2. EPC Information Retrieval (high level view)
The ability to specify an ONS query at the serial
number level of granularity as well as the archi-
tectural and economic impacts of that capability is
an open issue that will be addressed in subsequent
versions of this document. Its lack of mention here
should not be construed as making that behavior
legal or illegal.
This newly created domain name is now queried for by using
the usual DNS protocol. This implies that the (for now partial)
EPC moves through the subsequent local networks and the
Internet in clear text, and can be read, stored and analyzed by
any interested party on its way through the DNS hierarchy.
III. DNS HERITAGE
DNS is an old and central Internet service with a long
history of security issues in the protocol itself and in particular
implementations. This can easily be verified by consulting
established security sites as CERT [12], SecurityFocus [13]
and the SANS Institute’s ”Top 20 List of Internet Security
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Fig. 3. Using the EPC Network
Vulnerabilities” [14]. Interestingly, a corresponding RFC 3833,
”Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System” was only
published in 2004 [15] after long decades of use. Some of
the main known threats identified there are:
• Packet interception: Manipulating IP packets carrying
DNS information
• Query prediction: Manipulating the query and answer
schemes of the DNS protocol
• Cache poisoning: Various ways to inject manipulated
information into DNS caches
• Betrayal by trusted server: Attackers controlling DNS
servers in use
• Denial of service: Comparable to any network service,
though DNS itself might be used as an amplifier to attack
third parties [15, p.7]
The underlying reason for most of these vulnerabilities
consists of the fact that even though DNS is a highly exposed
service by definition, it has in its original (and widely used)
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form no way of authenticating a client, the server nor the in-
formation that is provided. These weaknesses directly transfer
to ONS.
IV. EPC CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY
There are many contexts where the EPC of a RFID tag
could be regarded as highly sensitive information – be it in
private [16] or in business environments (e.g. product and
raw material flows constitute valuable market information).
Many different ideas for securing the wireless RFID tag to
reader communication have been proposed, for examples and
overview confer to [17][18][19][20].
Even if the complete serial number is not known, the combi-
nation of object class and company identifier of the EPC is
usually enough to determine the kind of object it belongs to.
If the use of the EPCglobal network becomes ubiquitous and
widespread, the eavesdropper could easily add fake serial parts
to the captured incomplete EPC and query the corresponding
EPC-IS servers until a match is found.
This can be used to identify assets of an entity, be it an
individual, a household, a company or another organization.
If you happen to wear a rare item, or a rare combination of
belongings, tracking you might be accomplished even without
knowing the actual serial numbers, just using the object
classes.
The proposed solutions to mitigate these privacy problems
mostly do not take into account what happens to the EPC
once it is determined by a reading process. To make use of the
information stored in the EPC network about a given EPC you
need to locate the corresponding EPC-IS servers first. Even if
later on the connections to these servers are secured by using
for example SSL/TLS, the initial ONS look-up process has
neither been authenticated nor encrypted in the first place.
The DNS encoded main part of the EPC which identifies the
asset categories will first traverse every network between the
middleware and a possibly local DNS server in clear text –
this could include a local wireless network. Depending on
the configuration of DNS caching and resolution process, this
partial EPC will also be transmitted to additional DNS servers
in the resolution path, which might include the root DNS
servers, servers for onsepc.com and down the necessary
hierarchy [8, Section 2.6 on resolution], until the resolving
process finally gets to query a DNS server of the company that
serves as main reference for the object in question (usually the
manufacturer).
All traversed ISPs might capture the partial EPC – this
includes network taps placed by governmental organizations
of countries the packets may cross. It follows that attack trees
[21] describing for example the profiling of someone’s assets
will have new branches that represent remote tactics (Fig. 4)
– in addition to those already identified in [16].
As will be seen, there is no easy-to-deploy solution to this
problem given the proposed workings of ONS. The main
privacy enhancing strategy lies in obfuscating the source IP
or the real physical orign of the query.
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Fig. 4. New Branches for Attack Trees (Example Asset Profiling)
V. ONS INTEGRITY
Integrity in the ONS context refers to the correctness and
completeness of the returned information., i.e. addresses of
EPC Information Services corresponding to the queried EPC.
An attacker controlling intermediate DNS servers or launching
a successful man-in-the-middle attack on the communication
could forge the returned list of URIs and include – for
example – a server under her control. If there are no sufficient
authentication measures for the EPC-IS in place, the attacker
could deliver forged information about this particular or other
related EPCs from a similar domain.
To give short examples: if the query was initiated by a smart
refrigerator to order matching ingredients for a cooking recipe,
this could result in spoiled meals; if the query was issues by
a smart medicine cabinet (as a precursor to an even smarter
”home medical advisor” [22, p.51]) to prevent harmful drug
mixes, this might constitute an even larger threat to personal
safety.
VI. ONS AVAILABILITY
If the global EPC network becomes widespread reality, more
and more business processes (B2B, B2C) as well as private
applications will be able to use it without human intervention.
This would leave these processes highly dependable on a
working EPC resolution service for finding matching infor-
mation sources.
ONS will constitute a service highly exposed to attacks from
the Internet, if only due to its necessary widespread accessibil-
ity. This could include Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks overwhelming the server or its network connection by
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issuing countless and intense queries, or targeted exploits that
shut down the server software or its operating system.
Therefore an integration of the EPC network (with ONS as
proposed) into core business processes could leave even for-
merly non-IT related companies dependable on the availability
of Internet services. This will most probably increase overall
business risk.
VII. MITIGATION ATTEMPTS
A. Network Design
Larger enterprises may be able to reduce risks to EPC-
confidentiality by using a well-designed network structure,
especially a carefully planned DNS server hierarchy. All ONS
queries from internal machines at any company site could be
forwarded – preferably using Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
– to a central company DNS server, which in turn does the
external resolution process.
Even then all the EPCs that are resolved by the company
could be intercepted outside of the Intranet borders, but not
easily assigned to particular locations – though an attacker
might apply a careful analysis of time, possibly combining this
information with captured EPCs from region-specific objects.
As a simple example consider a company using smart offices
with ubiquitous RFID readers, where outsiders might witness
the introduction and the actual kind of new items (such as
newly introduced laptops of a specific manufacturer) anywhere
in the enterprise.
If a company just uses an internal and private version of the
EPC network without depending on outside information –
for example if only self-manufactured items are of interest
– no EPC leakage to outsiders would occur, and risks to
integrity and availability could be limited likewise to internal
attackers. But this special case would deprive the company of
the intended advantages of a global and dynamically updated
EPC network, as only company-internal data sources about
EPCs could be accessed.
Another countermeasure could be the prolonging of ONS and
EPC-IS caching times to reduce the frequency of the EPC
crossing the Internet. Depending on the application scenario,
the EPC-IS dynamics and the demand for fresh information
risk-reducing caching strategies might be viable.
B. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and Extranets
The idea of concentrating ONS queries to prevent an exact
locating of the corresponding items could be extended to
trusted business partners or neighbors that form a so-called
extranet [23, p.247] (Fig. 5).
All parties connect to a central ONS server via Virtual Private
Networks (VPN), and this server issues the ONS queries to
the outside world. Beyond this point no protection by VPN
might be feasible, if access to many different ”third parties”
beyond the borders of the extranet is required, as the possible
communication partners are nearly countless and not known in
advance – the problem of key management for building VPNs
to every company offering a relevant ONS and EPC-IS server
would render such solutions not scalable.
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Fig. 5. VPN and Extranets
Apart from issues of trust and administrative overhead
there will be an increased network load for the central party,
depending on the scale of RFID reader deployment, caching
strategies and the intense of usage of the EPC Network by
every single partner. The deployment of an Extranet could
only limit threats to EPC confidentiality, but not to information
integrity or ONS availability.
C. Anonymous Mixes
The culmination of the concentration strategy above, i.e.
collecting ONS queries from different sources to hide the real
source IP address, is the use of so-called anonymous mixes
[24], a strategy that might be viable also for private households
(Fig. 6).
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?
Fig. 6. Anonymous Mixes for EPC Network Traffic
There are approaches such as Onion Routing [25] and espe-
cially TOR [26], which basically transform and mix Internet
traffic from many different sources in such a way that it would
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be highly difficult to match a packet to a particular source.
TOR could also anonymize traffic to EPC-IS servers, and has
the potential to become highly relevant to a privacy preserving
use of the EPC network.
Again, this approach offers enhanced confidentiality, but does
not necessarily increase the integrity of the received messages
nor could it do anything about ONS server availability, as any
host offering services needs to be somehow addressable and
is therefore attackable.
D. DNSSEC
The main approach to address the security shortcom-
ings of DNS is called DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions)
[27][28][29]. It actually introduces two different and inde-
pendent procedures, one of these, called TSIG (Transaction
Signature [30]), provides mutual authentication between two
DNS servers by using shared secrets, which introduces big
problems of scalability.
The other method provides origin authenticity and data in-
tegrity for the delivered DNS information by using public-key
cryptography to sign sets of resource records (RRsets). These
signatures are stored itself in a different RR type. The server’s
public key could be transferred out-of-band, or itself be stored
in a RR of type DNSKEY. To verify a DNS server’s public key
it is envisaged to build chains of trust down from the root of
the DNS, where each parent DNS server signs the keys of its
children after having verified its correctness by some external
means.
DNSSEC is a very important approach for securing the In-
ternet at a critical protocol level, but has not been widely
adopted so far. Reasons might be the scalability problems of
key management and the difficulties in building chains of trust
between servers of many different organizations. Therefore
global ONS information integrity could only be assured by
DNSSEC in the long run, if the Internet community as a whole
adopts it.
However, even if DNSSEC could be widely configured to
actually encrypt the DNS information, which is not a stated
goal so far [27, Section 4, p.8], the company prefix of a given
EPC could still be guessed by following the sequence of IP
addresses the ONS queries are sent to.
No additional protection against the availability problem of
ONS servers is offered by deploying DNSSEC, on the contrary
– signature checking introduces additional load to the involved
servers [15, p.7].
VIII. SUMMARY
Using the EPCglobal network – as it is designed today – to
manage information about objects introduces many new risks.
In this paper we have focused on the corresponding lookup
service ONS because of the confidentiality issues purely
implied by its current design. We assume the actual EPC-
IS communication to be more easily securable by SSL/TLS
– though integrity problems through improper certificate han-
dling might spoil this assumption, and availability problems
do occur likewise.
If ONS is based on DNS as has been proposed in the spec-
ifications, a whole new branch of privacy problems do arise,
which could only in part be mitigated by security technology,
and would even then require huge efforts in network design.
For companies and individuals alike traffic anonymizers like
TOR [26] could present an interesting partial solution to
privacy-preserving ONS use and EPC-IS access. This approach
should be investigated further, e.g. in relation to scalability,
manageability and adverse effects due to possible authentica-
tion measures for accessing the EPC-IS.
Integrity of ONS information could be dealt with by deploying
DNSSEC, though this needs to be set up between all your
possible business partners and information service providers,
which seems very unlikely given the current diverse and
complex state of the Internet.
Availability of ONS and EPC-IS servers is a problem that
would have to be approached and dealt with by every company
in the resolution path.
Using automated business processes on top of the EPCnetwork
and ONS might introduce the same level of dependency on the
Internet for traditional businesses tomorrow as for e-commerce
companies today.
IX. FURTHER RESEARCH
The main movement from barcode to RFID tags containing
an EPC has started from the business viewpoint of saving costs
and simplifying supply chains, without taking into account
privacy-concerns of individuals.
The second step, i.e. the implementation of a global EPC-
network to store heterogeneous information about the corre-
sponding objects, appears at least in part be motivated by
future after sale applications. Again, it seems that security and
privacy are no integral part of the original design, but – if at
all – an afterthought.
This leads to many questions for further research, some of
which are:
• Is the plan of a global information storage acceptable at
all for individuals owning the objects?
• What about the other stakeholders, e.g. companies in the
supply chain who would need to offer access to possibly
sensitive information?
• What would be the exact security and privacy require-
ments for all stakeholders?
• What conflicts of interest might arise?
• What part of an EPC and what kind of stored information
should be considered public, and how should access rights
be configured?
• Should these access rights already influence the results
of the lookup service?
Based on a deeper analysis of the multilateral requirements
we aim to design an alternative model along with protocols
for its implementation.
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